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Abstract
This paper analyzes the relationships between HIV/AIDS and education taking into account the
appropriative nature of child income. We first build a simple theoretical model linking parental
health risk, educational choice and appropriation of future children’s income. We show that
considering (remittances from) child’s income as an insurance asset can reverse the usual negative
relationship between disease prevalence and educational investment. This prediction is tested on
data compiled from the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) database for 17 Sub-Sahara African
(SSA) countries between the years 2003 to 2010 for children aged between 6 and 22-years-old. To
account for the hierarchical nature of the data we employ a multilevel analysis. We find that, in
general, the impact of community HIV prevalence on school enrollment is insignificant. Once the
data is split to account for differences in appropriation, the effect of community prevalence becomes
positive and sometimes significant for highly appropriable groups (rural, girls) and remains either
negative for the rest.
Keywords: Health risk; Education; Insurance mechanism; Remittance.
JEL Classification Numbers: I15, I25.
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1 Introduction
Education has been proven to be key in developping countries, regarding both macroeconomic
(growth) and microeconomic (consumption smoothing, risk management) issues. Within
risk-sharing systems, education can act as a way to smooth consumption and to reduce the risk of
wealth loss induced by health risk. It is now well documented that health status and in particular
HIV status has an important (negative) impact on child education. This is particularly true in
developing countries where this negative relationship can lead to macroeconomic issues, such as
poverty trap. However, if we focus on the impact of health risk (which can be proxied by prevalence)
rather than health status, the impact on education seems less obvious. We therefore propose here to
enrich the analysis of the link between HIV and education by focusing – both theoretically and
empirically – on health risk (rather than status) and on the insurance role of education.
This paper refers to three fields of economic literature: i) the relationship between epidemics and
economic development at the micro level, i.e. how a health shock may jeopardize a household’s
future capacity to save, accumulate and generate future income (see Kawabata et al. 2002, Wagstaff
and Doorslaer 2003, Xu et al. 2003 and Flores et al. 20081; Fortson (2011) already demonstrates the
impact of HIV/AIDS on children’s education), ii) child labor and child income appropriation by
parents (for example Basu and Pham 1998 and Schoonbroodt and Tertilt 2010), iii) educational
choice as old-age insurance in the absence of social security, the most common situation in a lot of
African countries (Ehrlich and Lui 1991 for example studied the effect of changing mortality in an
overlapping-generations model in which children provide old-age support for their parents).
There are two ways of insuring for old age: educating one’s children or having a lot of children.
Investment in children, both quantitatively and qualitatively is an asset for parents, seen in
developing countries as a substitute for social security (see for example Nugent 1985, Michel and
Wigniole 2007 and Ehrlich and Lui 1991), especially in old age, which is often characterized by the
absence of labor income and the presence of elevated health-risk. However, the fundamental nature
of this insurance asset is that it is mobilized differently depending on the realization of a risk: actual
1The welfare effects of HIV can be approximated through the share of the household budget absorbed by HIV related
medical expenditures, (see for example Wagstaff and Doorslaer 2003 and Xu et al. 2003). When health expenditures represent
a large share of the healthcare the situation is defined as “catastrophic” as this implies either a substantial sacrifice of the
household current consumption, possibly including basic needs, or the mobilization of other resources (such as savings, assets,
credit and transfers from friends and family).
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repayments are contingent on bad event. Starting from this point, we add to the idea of investment
in children as an old-age insurance the notion of changing appropriation. This refers to the return
on investment in a child’s education being dependent on a variety of characteristics of the child and
it’s household. Moreover, the intensity with which parents invoke their “rights” on the income of
their descendants varies depending on their health status.
This is not only inspired by the need to draw a parallel with the classic insurance framework, but
can be connected to the notion of “child income appropriation” (see Schoonbroodt and Tertilt 2010):
in a lot of developing countries, the property rights on labor-income are shared between the different
members of a household and, at least partially, submitted to discretionary re-appropriation decisions
coming from the household community. Bazen and Salmon (2010) and McIntyre et al. (2006)
showed that “child-labor” and “premature removal from school” are connected with health shocks,
suggesting that child income indeed plays the role of an insurance asset, with repayments contingent
on a bad event. The recent paper of Maccini and Yang (2009) clearly follows the same direction, but
links schooling decisions to other types of shock (rainfall shocks) and focuses on the asymmetric
effect between girls and boys in the household (as in Duflo 2000). More generally, if we extend the
analysis to fields outside schooling choice, numerous authors, as Fafchamps (1992), Harrower and
Hoddinott (2005) and Park (2006), consider that shocks are insured through risk sharing networks
(not only household) and that remittances of labor-income act as contingent repayments in case of
negative shocks (see Gertler and Gruber 2002, Conroy et al. 2007). These intra-community transfers
are more or less compulsory, due to the need of reciprocity in the co-insurance system of the network
(Fafchamps 1992), or due to social punishment (Rapoport and Docquier 2006).
In the following, we first present a theoretical model to obtain testable predictions on the
relationship between health shock (on adults) and child education considering child education as an
insurance asset. We present the property of a “changing appropriation” in case of bad event. We
reinterpret the impact of the health shock on educational choice of households in a totally new
manner which allows to deal with an empirical “puzzle”. Indeed, our empirical findings are not
compatible with the existing view that a health shock necessarily has a negative effect on the
education of children.
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2 Theoretical Model
In this section we build a simple theoretical model to highlight the importance of child income
appropriation for the relationship between education and disease prevalence. While the literature
examines the quantitative choice (i.e. fertility) in respond to health shocks (see Becker and Barro
1988 for a survey), we focus on the qualitative decision on education enrollment, modeling here a
two-person household. We consider the problem of a representative household composed of a head
(the parent) and a child in a two-period model2.
In the first period (activity period), the parent has a secure revenue, ω, and chooses the proportion
of time they educate their child, t. When not enrolled in the educational system, that is in a
proportion (1− t) of the period, children earn for the household a wage, ωi, that can differ per child
depending on a set of characteristics, for example the gender of the child. The time spent in school
leads to an increase in the “basic” wage in the second period. We denote by ρ the return on each
unit of time spent in school, so that choosing t in period 1 gives as child income (1− t)ωi in period
1, and a period 2 income of (1 + ρt)ωi.
The health risk arises in first period after a decision on the education of the child has been made.
We model health risk as risk on wealth. With probability p, the parent falls ill in both periods (for
the sake of simplicity – and consistent with the pattern of HIV/AIDS – we assume that no
seropositivity is declared in the second period). The parent, if ill in the first period, loses an amount
ε1 of his revenue for that period and an amount ε2 of his second period revenue.
The second period is modeled as a retirement period in which the parent does not personally earn
money but rather relies on the appropriation of his child’s income (in accordance with the literature
on old-age security). We assume ε1 > ε2, that is, the monetary cost of illness is higher in the first
period than in the second. This is because while in the second period the loss of revenue is only due
to health costs, in the first period this loss is not only due to health costs but also due to the loss of
work time which translates into an income loss.
2The model is easily extended to situations where the revenue of the parent comes from their own parents (in terms of
educational investments). Results are robust to an overlapping-generation modeling with three periods (childhood, working
age and retirement) in which the child is born in good health and can only fall ill in the second period.
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The key mechanism of our model is the assumption that the proportion of child income
appropriated by the parent in the second period differs according to the parent’s health status and
that this proportion also differs across children. The variation may be explained for example, by
gender (see Maccini and Yang 2009 or Duflo 2000). To be precise, we assume that the parent
appropriates a proportion δ of his child’s revenue if healthy and a proportion δ + ∆i if unhealthy,
where ∆i is not necessarily homogeneous.
If we set β as the discount factor between the two periods, the problem of the parent in period 1
becomes:
max
t
p
[
u
(
C1
)
+ βu
(
C2
)]
+ (1− p) [u (C1)+ βu (C2)] (1)
where C1 = (1− t)ωi + ω
C1 = (1− t)ωi + ω − ε1
C2 = δ(1 + ρt)ω
i
C2 = (δ + ∆
i)(1 + ρt)ωi − ε2
For the model to remain tractable and realistic, we further assume that, if healthy, the parent is
always richer in the first period than in the second period, that is C1 > C2 (which corresponds to
ω > δ(1 + ρ)ωi) and always better off healthy than unhealthy, that is C1 > C1 and C2 > C2 (which
is written as ∆i(1 + ρ)ωi < ε2).
To capture the role of “changing appropriation”, we first analyze the baseline model where
appropriation is the same irrespective of the health status of the parent, i.e. ∆i = 0. We compare
this to the case where, through appropriation, education can play an insurance role ∆i > 0. We
show that while optimal education is decreasing with disease prevalence in the baseline case, the
asymmetric feature of appropriation can lead to a positive relationship.
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2.1 The benchmark case: no insurance role for education (∆i = 0)
Let us first assume that appropriation of child income by the parent does not increase in case of
disease, that is ∆i = 0. In such a case, the first order condition of (1) writes:
−pωiu′
(
C1
)
+ βpδρωiu′
(
C2
)− (1− p)ωiu′ (C1)+ β(1− p)δρωiu′ (C2) = 0
That is:
E(u′(C1))
E(u′(C2))
= βδρ
To analyze the effect of disease prevalence, p, on the optimal time spent in school, t, we define
f(t, p) ≡ E(u
′(C1))
E(u′(C2))
− βδρ
and use the Implicit Function Theorem:
∂t
∂p
= −∂f/∂p
∂f/∂t
to obtain,
∂f
∂p
=
(
u′
(
C1
)− u′ (C1))E(u′(C2))− (u′ (C2)− u′ (C2))E(u′(C1))
[E(u′(C2))]2
=
u′
(
C1
)
u′
(
C2
)− u′ (C1)u′ (C2)
[E(u′(C2))]2
(2)
When ∆i = 0, C2 = δ(1 + ρt)ω
i − ε2 and C2 −C2 = 2 for any t. As C1 −C1 = 1 ∀t, the income risk
faced by the parent is independent of the level of education he chooses for his child. Therefore, the
educational choice reduces to a wealth transfer between the two periods. To abstract from the
second order effect of wealth on risk aversion, we consider Constant Absolute Risk Aversion
(CARA) preferences:
u(C) = − 1
α
e−αC
It then turns out that:
Proposition 1. If the proportion of child revenue appropriated by the parent does not increase when
ill, i.e. ∆i = 0, the level of education, t, decreases with disease prevalence, p.
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Proof. See Appendix A.
This theoretical result is as a direct consequence of the income effects and intertemporal smoothing
decisions obtained in this framework. A health shock implies, first of all, household impoverishment,
with income losses of 1 and 2. For 1 > 2, we have that the education decision is downsized in the
face of diseases, to compensate potential income-loss in period 1. The slope between health risk, p,
and the level of education, t, is then negative as in Fortson (2011), who uses a different micro
modeling technique (human capital decision and mortality risk).
2.2 Assuming an insurance role for education (∆i > 0)
If we now assume that the part of child revenue appropriated in period 2 by the parent is higher in
case of ill health, i.e. ∆i > 0, the first order condition of program (1) becomes:
g(t, p) ≡ E(u
′(C1))− pβ∆iρu′(C2)
E(u′(C2))
− βδρ = 0
with,
∂g
∂p
=
∂f
∂p
− β∆
iρu′(C2)E(u′(C2))− pβ∆iρu′(C2)(u′(C2)− u′(C2))
[E(u′(C2))]2
=
u′
(
C1
)
u′
(
C2
)− u′ (C1)u′ (C2)− β∆iρu′(C2)u′(C2)
[E(u′(C2))]2
(3)
Note here that two forces are at play when we compare (3) and (2): (i) an extra negative term
appears in the numerator of (3) and (ii) ∆i (positive) increases C2 so that we now have
C2 > C2 − 2. On the one hand, education has a higher return for the parent due to their ability to
appropriate more, but on the other hand, the extra (expected) wealth in the second period reduces
the need for education for intertemporal consumption smoothing.
Moreover
∂g
∂t
=
∂f
∂t
−
pβ∆iρ(δ + ∆i)ρωiu
′′
(C2)E(u′(C2))− pβ∆iρu′(C2)
[
p(δ + ∆i)ρωiu
′′
(C2) + (1− p)δρωiu′′(C2)
]
[E(u′(C2))]2
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Assuming a CARA utility function this simplifies to:
∂g
∂t
=
∂f
∂t |∆i=0
− p∆
iρωi
[E(u′(C2))]2
{
u
′′ (
C2
)
E
(
u′ (C1)
)
+ (1− p)βρ∆iu′′(C2)u′(C2)
}
> 0
We therefore end up with,
∂t
∂p =
1
ωi
u′(C1)u′(C2)−u′(C2)[u′(C1)+β∆iρu′(C2)]
E(u′′ (C1))E(u′(C2))+δρE(u′′ (C2))E(u′(C1))+p∆iρωi[u′′(C2)E(u′(C1))+(1−p)βρ∆iu′′ (C2)u′(C2)] (4)
that leads to the following proposition
Proposition 2. When the proportion of child revenue appropriated by the parent is higher in the
case of ill health (∆i > 0), the level of education decreases with disease prevalence (in the case of
CARA preferences) if and only if agents are impatient enough, that is if and only if
β <
1
∆iρ
[
u′(C1)
u′(C2)
− u
′(C1)
u′(C2)
]
≡ β
In the other case, that is if β > β (with β > 0 whenever 1 > 2), the level of education increases in
p.
Remark 1. The role of changing appropriation (that is the “insurance role” of education) can be
inferred from this condition. When ∆i is positive, the negative slope between prevalence and
education (found when ∆i = 0, see Proposition 1) is more difficult to obtain. For high level of β
(β > β), we even find that the sign changes, with the slope becoming positive.
The intuition behind this result is quite simple. Assuming a change in the degree of appropriateness
under bad health gives education an insurance role, calling for an increase in education when risk
increases. The total effect of an increase in disease prevalence depends on whether this “insurance
effect” dominates the consumption smoothing effect found in the previous section. According to
proposition 2, the insurance effect dominates when the discount factor is large enough, that is, when
the weight of the second period (the one in which education plays its insurance role) is large enough
in the intertemporal utility function.
These theoretical results (Propositions 1 and 2) provides us with interesting testable predictions.
Indeed, data would confirm these mechanisms if, after proxying health risk, we find that (i) the
relationship between health risk and education is generally negative, but (ii) can become positive
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when education plays an important insurance role, for example for groups that are highly
appropriable. In the next sections, we test these predictions on data assuming that child or
parent/household characteristics can lead to different values of ∆i, that is, to heterogeneity in the
insurance role of education.
3 Data
We use the nationally representative cross-sectional data set, the Demographic and Health Survey
(DHS), for 17 Sub-Saharan African countries, namely Burkina Faso (2003), Cameroon (2004),
Congo Kinshasa (2007), Ethiopia (2005), Ghana (2003), Guinea (2005), Kenya (2008/09), Lesotho
(2009), Liberia (2007), Malawi (2010), Mali (2006), Niger (2006), Senegal (2005), Sierra Leone
(2008), Swaziland (2006/07), Zambia (2007) and Zimbabwe (2005/06). In this survey, data is
collected at both the individual and household level. The DHS has been conducted in developing
countries since 1984 with the aim of providing countries with data needed to monitor and evaluate
population, health and nutrition programs on a regular basis. The data is collected usually every 5
years though a few are collected over shorter time intervals. It contains household data on basic
characteristics of members of each household and also specific data on both male and female
household members between the ages 15 and 49 inclusive. These surveys include testing for the
HIV/AIDS status of members of the household 15 to 49 years of age. The sampling frame used in
most DHS is, by definition, a list of non-overlapping area units with a majority of DHS sample
designs clustered and stratified.
We test for the impact of HIV prevalence at the community level on educational enrollment focusing
on individuals between the ages of 6 and 22 inclusive. There are, for our analysis, 357873 individuals
within 128575 households nested in 6814 communities which are in turn nested in 17 countries. We
take a look at the relationship between the HIV prevalence rates (that proxies health risk) and
enrollment rates at the community level, for each country of our sample. The HIV prevalence rates
are calculated using individuals between the ages of 15 and 49 years inclusive. From Figure 1, there
appears not to exist a priori a clear relationship between prevalence rates and enrollment rate.
Depending on the country, this relationship can be positive, negative, or even insignificant.
Insert Figure 1 here
10
Our theoretical model suggests that differences in appropriation of child income can be the source of
this observed heterogeneity. A first way to examine this mechanism is to look at the differences in
the bi-dimensional relationship between HIV prevalence rates and enrollment rates when
differentiating urban and rural areas (appropriation being easier in rural areas according to Nugent
1985). Figure 2 takes a first look at this relationship for Lesotho (one of the countries with the most
striking figures3). In Lesotho, the relation between community prevalence and educational
enrollment is either positive or negative depending on the type of place of residence. In figure 1 we
have that the overall effect is slightly positive (certainly insignificant) but when we take type of place
of residence into account, we find that this effect can be decomposed into a negative relationship in
urban areas and a positive one in rural areas where appropriation of child income is much easier.
Insert Figure 2 here
This bi-dimensional analysis however needs to be confirmed by a deeper study, controlling for
various confounding factors known to influence educational enrollment rate. Therefore, in the
following, in addition to community prevalence rates and country enrollment rates, we control for
child and household characteristics including
• Child characteristics: Age, gender, residency status and relation to head.
• Household characteristics: Proportion of children below 5, type of place of residence,
income, gender of head, age of head, HIV status of the household and educational level of head.
Regarding these characteristics (see table 1), our sample contains children of average age 12.85 years
old with an almost equal number of males and females. Most of these children are usual residents of
their households with a little over half being children of the head of the household. Households have
about 16.85% of their children below the ages of 5. Approximately 69.07% of households are located
in rural areas with 74.14% of the households being headed by males. About 43.93% of the household
heads are uneducated, while 5.9801% of the households have an HIV+ member.
Insert Table 1 here
Regarding educational level (primary, secondary or university) we have:
Insert Table 2 here
3See Appendix 3 for results for all countries
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4 Empirical Model
We now analyze more precisely the effect of HIV risk, proxied by community level HIV prevalence,
on education, i.e. the attendance status of children. Recall that our theoretical model predicts that
this effect is generally negative but can turn out to be positive for households in which the part of
child income appropriated increases in case of bad health (this intuition being that is it more likely
among highly appropriable children). To study the impact of community HIV prevalence on the
school attendance status of a child we use a multilevel model. The multilevel model allows us to
take into account random components at the individual, household, community and country level.
As our data is hierarchical in nature, ignoring the clustering will imply that the independence
condition is violated. In such a case, the standard errors are underestimated (see Guo and Zhao
(2000); results from the standard binary model can be found in Appendix D). The hierarchical
structure in our data comes from the fact that we pool our data across countries and also from the
design of the DHS, where individuals are nested within households which are in turn nested within
communities. Due to the complex nature of our analysis, that is the existence of 4 levels, we do a
preliminary test of the significance of the levels. We are able to include contextual HIV/AIDS
factors at the community level. We observe yijkl, the enrollment status of individual i in household j
in community k in country l where
yijkl =
 1 if currently enrolled or was enrolled in current year0 otherwise (5)
Let us denote by pijlk the probability that yijkl = 1 that is:
pijkl = Pr (yijkl = 1)
Then by denoting piijkl = ln
(
pijkl
1−pijkl
)
we have that
piijkl = α0 + αXijkl + βZjkl + γWkl + ηVl + θijkl + υjkl + kl + φl (6)
where α0 is the intercept, α is the vector of coefficients for the covariates Xijkl, β is the vector of
coefficients associated with the covariates Zjkl, γ the vector of coefficients for covariates Wkl and η
the vector of coefficients for covariates Vl. The covariates, Xijkl varies at the individual level, Zjkl
varies at the household level, Wkl at the community level and Vl at the country level. The error
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terms at the individual, household, community and country levels are given as θijkl, υjkl, kl and φl
respectively and have means 0 and variances, σ2in, σ
2
hh, σ
2
cm and σ
2
ct respectively, (see Goldstein
1991). We first calculate the intra-class correlations to look at the contribution of each level to the
overall variance. This variable is calculated from the empty model:
piijkl = α0 + θijkl + υjkl + kl + φl (7)
Estimates of household, community and country level variances are used to calculate the intra-class
correlation coefficients to determine the proportion of group-level variance compared to total
variance, using the following formula:
ρhh =
σ2hh
σ2hh + σ
2
cm + σ
2
ct + σ
2
in
(8)
ρcm =
σ2rg
σ2hh + σ
2
cm + σ
2
ct + σ
2
in
(9)
and
ρct =
σ2ct
σ2hh + σ
2
cm + σ
2
ct + σ
2
in
(10)
where ρhh, ρcm and ρct are the intra-class correlations at the household, community and country
levels and σ2in is the variance at the individual level, where for the case of a multilevel logistic
regression is fixed at pi
2
3 , i.e. 3.289 (see Hedeker and Gibbsons 1996).
The empty model gives us as variances for the four levels σ2in = 3.2899, σ
2
hh = 0.7017, σ
2
cm = 0.9317
and σ2ct = 0.7487. From equation (8) we obtain as intra-class correlation rates ρhh = 12.3713,
ρcm = 16.4263 and ρct = 13.1999 meaning that 12.3713% of the total variation is explained at the
household level, with 16.4263% explained at the community level and 12.3713% at the country level.
Based on this result, we include the four levels in our multilevel model. We now discuss the results
we obtain from our multilevel model.
5 Results
Running our empirical model on Demographic and Health Surveys, we confirm previous findings
(see table [?]). We indeed find that (i) having an HIV+ household member implies a negative
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impact on the probability of enrolling in school, a result that can be reconciled with Fortson (2011)
(ii) living in rural areas also has a negative and significant effect on enrollment whereas (iii) being
from a high income household has a positive and significant impact on the probability of being
enrolled. Regarding, our variable of interest, we first find that, taking into account the whole
sample, the probability of being enrolled in school is not significantly affected by the probability of
adult household members becoming HIV+.
The results are nuanced if, as in Nugent (1985), and based on the second part of the theoretical
model (allowing for heterogeneous appropriateness), we split our data based on gender and on type
of place of residence of the household.
Insert Table 3 here
An increase in HIV prevalence (the probability of adult household members becoming HIV+) leads
to a reduction in male enrollment but an increase in female children enrollment, though the effect
for females are insignificant. According to our theoretical, this would come from the fact that
females are more appropriable than their male counterparts. The result can be related to the
findings of Maccini and Yang (2009) or De la Brie`re et al. (2002) who advocate that girls are often
used as insurance assets (in the case of rainfall shocks for Maccini and Yang (2009)).
The same kind of results can be inferred from the split between urban and rural regions. As children
are more easily appropriable in rural regions, we find that an increase in HIV-prevalence decreases
the probability of enrollment in urban areas but increase it in rural areas. These two results on
subsamples confirm the predictions of our theoretical model, as we find that for subgroup of children
that are highly appropriable (female children and children in rural areas), the insurance role of
education can lead to a positive (and sometimes significant) relationship between the probability of
becoming HIV+ and the probability of being enrolled in school.
Insert Table 4 here
As a final check we split the data based on the age groups (see Table 4). We find that our key
relationship (between HIV prevalence and educational enrollment) is positive and significant for
children from 6 to 12, insignificant for children from 13 to 18 and negative and significant for
children aged 19 to 22. This seems to confirm the insurance role plaid by children future income as
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the positive relationship highlighted in our theoretical model is mainly present for young children
(who closely corresponds to the one modeled in the theoretical part).
The two last columns of Table 4 split data with respect to the degree of community HIV prevalence.
We then find that our positive relationship is restricted to areas where HIV prevalence remains low.
In our view, this underlines that the total effect consists of the insurance (positive) effect presented
here and the usual negative effect (through household income effect and other macroeconomic
mechanisms4); and that the positive effects can only dominate in low prevalence community.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
We have analyzed the impact of health risk, and specifically HIV/AIDS risk, on education taking
into account the fact that education of children can act as a form of insurance against shocks, and in
this particular case, health shocks in old-age. We first built a theoretical model where active adults
invest in the education of their children. We find that in the absence of extra appropriation in case
of ill health, an increase in the probability of falling ill leads to a reduction in the time children
spend in school. However when there is an opportunity for extra appropriation in bad health events,
we have that health risk may in some cases lead to an increase in the amount of education, especially
when family’s response in terms of required remittance (the extra amount appropriable) is very high.
We test the idea that an increase in the probability of falling ill can lead to an increase in
educational investments and find that (i) for the overall population of 6 to 22-year-olds the effect is
negative but that (ii) once the data is split between males and females the effect becomes positive
for females. When we also split the data between rural and urban households we find a positive and
significant effect in the rural areas.
We therefore verify the conventional result (a negative relationship between education and HIV
prevalence, see Fortson (2011)) for a subsample of children: male children and children living in
urban areas. But we enrich it for children of another type: female children and children in rural
areas for whom the relationship seems to be positive (a result already emphasized by some: see
4Unicef 2000[26] underlines that the number of African children having lost their teachers because of AIDS was around
860 000 in 1999, It means that the replacement rate of teachers, due to the pandemic, is not large enough to provide a
desirable level of education.
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Bennell, Hyde and Swainson (2002) and Bennell (2004)). This empirical “puzzle”, i.e. this
surprising non-monotonicity, opens the door to a new theoretical reasoning different from the usual
one of consumption smoothing. Our interpretation of these results is that, depending on how
appropriable the income of ones child is, education acts as an insurance asset, providing protection
in bad events. This attribute could reverse the sign of the relationship between disease prevalence
and schooling. Our theoretical model provides one possible explanation of such a mechanism.
These results suggest that the role of remittance systems would be an interesting avenue to explore.
In our empirical setting, we have proxied differences in appropriateness by exogenous characteristics
(gender, urban/rural areas) that have been proven in other papers to be related to appropriateness.
However, more attention needs to be paid to our key mechanism of “changing appropriateness”, for
example by analyzing to what extent (and based on which characteristics) remittances change
depending on the health status of parents.
Last, regarding the policy implications of our work, it seems worth emphasizing that the general
picture we obtain is that HIV/AIDS disease indeed has a negative impact on school enrollment.
First, the fact that family members are infected (individual HIV status) is always associated with a
decrease in the probability of schooling. Second, when we obtain a positive effect of HIV risk rate
(community prevalence), we must keep in mind that the estimated coefficient evaluates the actual
consolidation of different forces, sometimes positive (insurance effect) and generally negative
(income effect, supply side effect on the educational sector). This is clearly demonstrated by the
various stratifications of the estimations, showing that the positive effect only dominates for young
children, in rural areas, in countries of low prevalence. In brief, the findings of this paper clearly do
not support a decrease in schooling support in Least Developed Countries(LDC). To the contrary,
the lesson is that supply-oriented policies should be favored, as the demand for education can be
partly self-sustained, given the insurance effect.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
We have:
∂f
∂p
=
(
u′
(
C1
)− u′ (C1))E(u′(C2))− (u′ (C2)− u′ (C2))E(u′(C1))
[E(u′(C2))]2
=
u′
(
C1
)
u′
(
C2
)− u′ (C1)u′ (C2)
[E(u′(C2))]2
(11)
Therefore, ∂f∂p is of the sign of
u′(C1)
u′(C1)
− u
′(C2)
u′(C2)
, that is, in the case of ∆i = 0, the sign of
u′(C1−ε1)
u′(C1)
− u
′(C2−ε2)
u′(C2)
Noticing that u
′(C−ε)
u′(C) is constant in C in the case of Constant Absolute Risk Aversion, it turn
out that:
u′(C1−ε1)
u′(C1)
− u
′(C2−ε2)
u′(C2)
≥ 0 as ε1 > ε2.
Lemma 1. If u(.) exhibits CARA, ∂f∂p |∆i=0
≥ 0
Note that the previous lemma also hold for preferences exhibiting Increasing Absolute Risk
Aversion and that the result is ambiguous for Decreasing absolute risk aversion
As, moreover,
∂f
∂t |∆i=0
=
−ωiE(u′′(C1))E(u′(C2))− δρωiE(u′′(C2))E(u′(C1))
[E(u′(C2))]2
> 0
proposition 1 holds.
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B Description of Variables and Summary Statistics
Insert Table 5 here
Insert Table 6 here
Insert Table 7 here
C Community Enrollment vs Prevalence Over Type of
Place of Residence for All Countries
Insert Figure 3 here
D Results from the Binary Model
Insert Table 8 here
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E Graphs and Figures
Figure 1: Community Enrollment vs Prevalence Per Country
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Figure 2: Community Enrollment vs Prevalence Over Type of Place of Residence for Lesotho
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Figure 3: Community Enrollment vs Prevalence Over Type of Place of Residence for All Countries
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E.1 Tables
Variable N Mean Std Dev
Age 363607 12.8557 4.7883
Male 363592 0.4979 0.5000
Usual Resident 363351 0.9746 0.1574
Child of Head 363532 0.6256 0.4840
Prop. of Children < 5 130165 0.1685 0.1560
Rural 130165 0.6907 0.4622
Male Head 130165 0.7414 0.4379
Head 40 - 59 years 130165 0.3968 0.4892
Head 60 - 79 years 130165 0.1778 0.3823
Head ≥ 80 years 130165 0.0205 0.1416
Middle Income 130165 0.2004 0.4003
High Income 130165 0.4125 0.4923
Household HIV+ 130165 0.0598 0.2371
Household HIV Status Unknown 130165 0.5149 0.4998
Head Uneducated 129081 0.4393 0.4963
Table 1: Summary Statistics
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No Education Primary Secondary Higher Total
6 to 12 38.79 60.78 0.43 0.00 100.00
13 to 18 23.57 53.17 23.18 0.08 100.00
19 to 22 28.66 32.40 36.66 2.27 100.00
Total 32.18 53.70 13.72 0.39 100.00
Table 2: Highest Educational Level of Individuals Per Age Group
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Fixed Effects
Variable Total Male Female Urban Rural
Intercept −3.3371∗∗∗ −2.4997∗∗∗ −3.6439∗∗∗ −1.7544∗∗∗ −4.8271∗∗∗
(0.1397) (0.0853) (0.2626) (0.3045) (0.1768)
Age 1.1302∗∗∗ 1.1362∗∗∗ 1.1719∗∗∗ 0.9639∗∗∗ 1.2402∗∗∗
(0.0069) (0.0094) (0.0105) (0.0119) (0.0086)
Age-Squared −0.0480∗∗∗ −0.0464∗∗∗ −0.0517∗∗∗ −0.0410∗∗∗ −0.0528∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Male 0.4530∗∗∗ 0.5300∗∗∗ 0.4173∗∗∗
Usual Resident 0.1763∗∗∗ 0.2892∗∗∗ 0.0493 0.2249∗∗∗ 0.0916∗∗
(0.0330) (0.0486) (0.0458) (0.0582) (0.0404)
Child of Head 0.6871∗∗∗ 0.4069∗∗∗ 0.8397∗∗∗ 0.8605∗∗∗ 0.5921∗∗∗
(0.0120) (0.0166) (0.0169) (0.0206) (0.0147)
Household HIV+ −0.0487∗ −0.0683∗ −0.0281 0.0122 −0.0877∗∗∗
(0.0274) (0.0362) (0.0368) (0.0467) (0.0337)
Household HIV Unknown −0.0266∗∗ −0.0063 −0.0388∗∗ −0.0150 −0.0337∗∗
(0.0129) (0.0164) (0.0174) (0.0244) (0.0152)
Rural −0.8149∗∗∗ −0.8188∗∗∗ −0.8352∗∗∗
(0.0312) (0.0336) (0.0363)
Middle Income 0.3195∗∗∗ 0.3155∗∗∗ 0.3739∗∗∗ 0.2657∗∗∗ 0.3616∗∗∗
(0.0171) (0.0217) (0.0229) (0.0565) (0.0180)
High Income 0.7941∗∗∗ 0.8002∗∗∗ 0.8855∗∗∗ 0.9762∗∗∗ 0.7527∗∗∗
(0.0192) (0.0300) (0.0257) (0.0522) (0.0211)
Prop. of Child. < 5 −0.8896∗∗∗ −0.0335 −1.3894∗∗∗ −1.5303∗∗∗ −0.6006∗∗∗
(0.0462) (0.0629) (0.0624) (0.0876) (0.0543)
Head Uneducated −0.7298∗∗∗ −0.7720∗∗∗ −0.7910∗∗∗ −0.9386∗∗∗ −0.6136∗∗∗
(0.0158) (0.0201) (0.0210) (0.0289) (0.0188)
Head 40-59 0.1765∗∗∗ 0.1341∗∗∗ 0.2147∗∗∗ 0.2731∗∗∗ 0.1235∗∗∗
(0.0144) (0.0190) (0.0195) (0.0262) (0.0172)
Head 60-79 0.2958∗∗∗ 0.2051∗∗∗ 0.3758∗∗∗ 0.3917∗∗∗ 0.2308∗∗∗
(0.0184) (0.0239) (0.0249) (0.0352) (0.0217)
Head > 80 0.4318∗∗∗ 0.3225∗∗∗ 0.5504∗∗∗ 0.6588∗∗∗ 0.3078∗∗∗
(0.0426) (0.0551) (0.0568) (0.0916) (0.0482)
Head Male −0.2703∗∗∗ −0.2368∗∗∗ −0.3440∗∗∗ −0.2600∗∗∗ −0.2552∗∗∗
(0.0146) (0.0194) (0.0195) (0.0258) (0.0172)
Cluster HIV Prevalence 0.0009 −0.0035∗∗ 0.0017 −0.0051∗∗ 0.0108∗∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0023)
Country Enrollment Rate 0.0624∗∗∗ 0.0570∗∗∗ 0.0693∗∗∗ 0.0271∗∗∗ 0.0758∗∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0010) (0.0044) (0.00582) (0.0029)
Random Effects
Household
Int. Variance 1.0133 0.9574 0.9006 1.1560 0.9283
Int. Std. Deviation 1.0066 0.9784 0.9490 1.0752 0.9635
Community
Int. Variance 0.8990 0.8651 1.0008 0.3874 0.9538
Int. Std. Deviation 0.9481 0.9301 1.0004 0.6224 0.9766
Country
Int. Variance 0.0173 - 0.0744 0.0963 0.0290
Int. Std. Deviation 0.1317 - 0.2728 0.3103 0.1703
Number of Obs. 357873 178561 179332 105563 252310
Groups: Household 128575 93002 101415 37060 91515
Groups: Cluster 6814 6812 6810 2291 4523
Groups: Country 17 17 17 17 17
Table 3: Impact of HIV Prevalence
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Fixed Effects
Variable 6 - 12 13 - 18 19 - 22 Low Prevalence High Prevalence
Intercept −3.4162∗∗∗ −3.2379∗∗∗ −2.5942∗∗∗ −3.1362∗∗∗ −2.9248∗∗∗
(0.6458) (0.3262) (0.6636) (0.1321) (0.2992)
Age 2.9692∗∗∗ 0.7783∗∗∗ −2.5452∗∗∗ 1.0722∗∗∗ 1.2356∗∗∗
(0.0391) (0.1019) (0.5104) (0.0080) (0.0140)
Age-Squared −0.1406∗∗∗ −0.0395∗∗∗ 0.0520∗∗∗ −0.0445∗∗∗ −0.0552∗∗∗
(0.0022) (0.0033) (0.0125) (0.0003) (0.0005)
Male 0.1929∗∗∗ 0.6193∗∗∗ 0.8772∗∗∗ 0.5416∗∗∗ 0.1860∗∗∗
(0.0152) (0.0170) (0.0265) (0.0114) (0.0202)
Usual Resident 0.1444∗ 0.1801∗∗∗ −0.3535∗∗∗ 0.1085∗∗ 0.0856∗
(0.0767) (0.0491) (0.0561) (0.0476) (0.0486)
Child of Head 0.4001∗∗∗ 0.8078∗∗∗ 0.6162∗∗∗ 0.6996∗∗∗ 0.7241∗∗∗
(0.0204) (0.0198) (0.0313) (0.0142) (0.0233)
Household HIV+ −0.0501 −0.0806∗ −0.2088∗∗∗ −0.0176 −0.0900∗∗∗
(0.0468) (0.0413) (0.0556) (0.0599) (0.0340)
Household HIV Unknown −0.0410∗∗ −0.1021∗∗∗ −0.0088 −0.0211 −0.0594∗∗
(0.0193) (0.0198) (0.0288) (0.0147) (0.0285)
Rural −1.1558∗∗∗ −0.7229∗∗∗ −0.6304∗∗∗ −1.0414∗∗∗ −0.2272∗∗∗
(0.0450) (0.0381) (0.0423) (0.0392) (0.0498)
Middle Income 0.4307∗∗∗ 0.4437∗∗∗ 0.1872∗∗∗ 0.3289∗∗∗ 0.3351∗∗∗
(0.0248) (0.0260) (0.0421) (0.0200) (0.0340)
High Income 1.0130∗∗∗ 0.8784∗∗∗ 0.8174∗∗∗ 0.7943∗∗∗ 0.8823∗∗∗
(0.0287) (0.0287) (0.0410) (0.0226) (0.0378)
Prop. of Child. < 5 −0.0785 −1.0899∗∗∗ −2.6911∗∗∗ −0.6944∗∗∗ −1.4031∗∗∗
(0.0710) (0.0753) (0.1069) (0.0546) (0.0907)
Head Uneducated −0.9036∗∗∗ −0.8728∗∗∗ −0.8385∗∗∗ −0.7500∗∗∗ −0.6491∗∗∗
(0.0236) (0.0236) (0.0350) (0.0185) (0.0315)
Head 40-59 0.0014 0.2395∗∗∗ 0.6403∗∗∗ 0.1878∗∗∗ 0.1811∗∗∗
(0.0214) (0.0242) (0.0375) (0.0171) (0.0282)
Head 60-79 0.0676∗∗ 0.3239∗∗∗ 0.6862∗∗∗ 0.2537∗∗∗ 0.4100∗∗∗
(0.0289) (0.0285) (0.0432) (0.0219) (0.0362)
Head > 80 0.2274∗∗∗ 0.5024∗∗∗ 0.6635∗∗∗ 0.4326∗∗∗ 0.4312∗∗∗
(0.0670) (0.0610) (0.0958) (0.0515) (0.0790)
Head Male −0.2526∗∗∗ −0.2967∗∗∗ −0.2743∗∗∗ −0.2929∗∗∗ −0.2225∗∗∗
(0.0235) (0.0219) (0.0302) (0.0182) (0.0259)
Cluster HIV Prevalence 0.0121∗∗∗ −0.0031 −0.0065∗∗∗ 0.0380∗∗∗ −0.0025
(0.0027) (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0083) (0.0022)
Country Enrollment Rate 0.0892∗∗∗ 0.0635∗∗∗ 0.0186∗ 0.0610∗∗∗ 0.0567∗∗∗
(0.0109) (0.0055) (0.0112) (0.0021) (0.0048)
Random Effects
Household
Int. Variance 1.52714 0.7429 0.4828 1.0164 1.1390
Int. Std. Deviation 1.2358 0.8619 0.6948 1.0082 1.0673
Community
Int. Variance 1.4231 0.9406 0.6329 0.9899 0.5351
Int. Std. Deviation 1.1929 0.9698 0.7956 0.9950 0.7315
Country
Int. Variance 0.4925 0.1188 0.5212 0.0113 0.0765
Int. Std. Deviation 0.7018 0.3447 0.7219 0.1064 0.2766
Number of Obs. 184164 116685 57024 255785 102088
Groups: Household 94988 73415 46124 88929 39646
Groups: Cluster 6802 6802 6773 4607 2207
Groups: Country 17 17 17 17 17
Table 4: Impact of HIV Prevalence (Age and Prevalence)
28
Variable Measure
Outcome Variable
Currently Enrolled Coded as 1 if individual is currently enrolled or was enrolled in current year, 0 otherwise
Explanatory Variables
Age Age of Child centered at grand mean
Age2 The squared age of the child centered at grand mean
Usual Resident Coded as 1 if the individual is a usual resident of the household and 0 if not
Child of Head Coded as 1 if the individual is the child of the household head and 0 otherwise
Prop. of Children < 5 Proportion of household members who are less than 5 years old
Rural Coded as 1 if the household is located in a rural area and 0 otherwise
Male Head Coded as 1 if the household is headed by a man and 0 otherwise
Head 40 - 59 years Coded as 1 if the household head is between the ages of 40 and 59 inclusive and 0 otherwise
Head 60 - 79 years Coded as 1 if the household head is between the ages of 60 and 79 inclusive and 0 otherwise
Head ≥ 80 years Coded as 1 if the household head is at least 80 years and 0 otherwise5
Middle Income Coded as 1 if the household is middle income and 0 otherwise
High Income Coded as 1 if the household is high income and 0 otherwise6
Head HIV+ Coded as 1 if household head is HIV+ and 0 if negative or unknown
Head HIV status unknown Coded as 1 if household head’s HIV status is unknown and 0 if head is either HIV+ or HIV-
Head Uneducated Coded as 1 if household head is uneducated and 0 otherwise
Cluster Level Contextual Variable
Cluster HIV Rate The weighted HIV prevalence rates at the community level
Country Level Contextual Variable
Country Enrollment Rate The weighted Enrollment rates at the national level
Table 5: Variable Description
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